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Conditional Cash Transfers: Why Targeting
and Conditionalities Could Fail
by Guy Standing, Professor of Economic Security,
University of Bath, UK
IPC One Pager #44, “Growing Pains”, argues that cash transfer
programmes should become a permanent feature of social
protection in developing countries. This One Pager takes that logic
further, advocating a universal income grant as a foundation for
basic economic security (see Standing 2007). Such an approach
views targeting and conditionalities as both unnecessary and
counter-productive.
Universal schemes are more necessary than ever as globalization and
economic informalisation make economic insecurity more pervasive.
Economic downturns and socio-economic disasters have become
more numerous—whether due to economic forces or climatic
conditions, and whether their impact is sudden (such as floods)
or protracted (such as famines). The resultant costs can radically
erode a household’s capacity to sustain a viable livelihood base.
Cash Transfer Advantages
Are cash transfers an answer? Compared to alternatives such as
food aid, they tend to be more effective. Commodity-based
assistance is paternalistic: families have to accept what is presumed
good for them, e.g., food, instead of making their own choices
based on more income. Such assistance can also be market-
distorting, as when it drives down prices for food grown locally
or nationally. Moreover, such programmes strengthen a sense of
charity rather than economic rights.
Can cash transfers do better? They can be distributed quickly, their
administrative costs tend to be low, their selection of beneficiaries
can be transparent and they provide freedom of choice in how the
money can be spent. They can also contribute to rebuilding and
sustaining livelihoods.
The ‘Cash for Relief Programme’ in Ethiopia, which was used to
address crop failures, is an example. Its evaluation showed that cash
grants were used to pay off debts, restore land productivity and help
regenerate livelihoods. In contrast, food aid might have fostered only
current consumption. The ‘Cash for Herder’ schemes in Mongolia
were similar in their impact, reviving investment in assets, such as
herds, that could regenerate livelihoods and the local economy.
Other such programmes have reduced the distress renting out
of land or out-migration, helped households pool savings, and
allowed farmers to sell their crops when prices are high and to
buy seeds or livestock so that they could start work again.
Conditionalities
However, many cash transfer programmes have strategic
weaknesses: they are neither universal nor non-conditional.
They mix ‘means-testing’ with ‘behaviour-testing’ and often
gravitate towards social therapy. Some of the most well-known
schemes, such as Mexico’s Oportunidades, have evolved into
complex mechanisms of social engineering.
Operating a means-tested conditional programme, such as making
grants to poor families based on their children’s school attendance,
requires considerable administrative capacity—which is often sorely
lacking in many low-income countries. Such schemes are also
inherently paternalistic even if they impose conditions, such as
ensuring children’s education, that are universally accepted.
They assume, in effect, that a poor family must be irrational or
incapable of knowing what is in its long-term interests or lacks
some kind of vital information. Moreover, in rural areas of Latin
America and throughout regions such as sub-Saharan Africa,
conditionalities related to health and education are likely
to be ineffective because of a lack of schools, health
clinics and transport.
Targeting creates additional problems. It implies maintaining a
sophisticated and updated registration system. But such a system
would have inherent problems with families that are economically
insecure, since their incomes fluctuate unpredictably above and
below any given poverty line.
Targeting
Targeting is often implemented primarily to gain political support
from the non-poor. This is based on the dubious distinction
between ‘the deserving poor’ (who often cannot work or are
extremely deprived) and the ‘undeserving poor’ (who are capable
of working and should not accept ‘hand-outs’, at least not for
very long). There is little debate that children are ‘deserving’ but
why should poor families with pre-school children or no children
be excluded from receiving transfers?
But programmes that rely on targeting and conditionalities
are invariably arbitrary, inequitable and inefficient. In contrast,
universal security schemes are administratively simple,
low-cost and affordable. They would also be non-stigmatising
(based on a universal entitlement to transfers) as well as non-
paternalistic. Most importantly, they would help strengthen
social solidarity, contribute to households’ freedom of choice
and contribute to sustainable livelihoods and dignified work.
Reference:
Guy Standing (2007). ‘How Cash Transfers Boost Work and Economic Security’.
UNDESA Working Paper #58, October.